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You are a security-focused code agent. A reflected XSS vulnerability was detected at `GET /search?q=`.

**Task:** Ensure the `q` parameter (and any other user-controlled query parameters) are HTML-encoded before being rendered into page output.

**Scope:**
- Find the route handler and template/component that renders the search results page.
- Check all other query-parameter reflections across `src/routes/` and `src/views/`.

**Acceptance criteria:**
1. The `q` value is HTML-entity-encoded wherever it appears in rendered output.
2. A `Content-Security-Policy` header is set in the response (or in the global middleware) that disallows inline scripts.
3. Add a test that sends `<script>alert(1)</script>` as the query and asserts the raw tag does not appear in the response body.

You are a security-focused code agent. A broken object-level authorization (BOLA) vulnerability was detected at `GET /api/invoices/:id`.

**Task:** Add an ownership check so the endpoint only returns an invoice if the authenticated user owns it.

**Scope:**
- Find the route handler for `GET /api/invoices/:id` in `src/api/` or `src/routes/`.
- Check sibling CRUD endpoints (`PUT`, `DELETE`) on the same resource for the same issue.

**Acceptance criteria:**
1. After fetching the record, the handler compares `invoice.userId` (or equivalent) to the authenticated session's user ID.
2. If they do not match, the endpoint returns `403 Forbidden` — not a 404 and not the record.
3. Add an integration test: authenticate as user A, attempt to fetch user B's invoice, assert 403.
4. Do not change the response shape for authorized requests.

You are a security-focused code agent. Sensitive server credentials are being leaked via `GET /api/config`.

**Task:** Replace the full config serialization with an explicit allowlist of safe, client-facing fields.

**Scope:**
- Find the `/api/config` route handler and its serialization logic.
- Audit other endpoints that return configuration or system objects for the same pattern.

**Acceptance criteria:**
1. The response only includes fields explicitly approved for client consumption (e.g. `publicApiUrl`, `featureFlags`).
2. Keys like database URLs, internal API tokens, and service credentials are absent from the response.
3. Add a test that calls `GET /api/config` and asserts none of the known secret field names appear in the JSON body.
4. Note any credentials that were exposed so they can be rotated — do not rotate them in this PR.

You are a security-focused code agent. An open redirect vulnerability was detected at `GET /auth/callback?next=`.

**Task:** Validate the `next` parameter server-side so it can only redirect to same-origin paths.

**Scope:**
- Find the OAuth callback handler in `src/auth/` or `src/routes/auth/`.
- Check any other post-authentication redirect logic for the same pattern.

**Acceptance criteria:**
1. The handler parses the `next` value and rejects it if the host differs from the application's own origin.
2. If `next` is invalid or absent, the user is redirected to a safe default (e.g. `/dashboard`).
3. Add tests: (a) a same-origin `next` is followed, (b) an external `next` is ignored and falls back to the default.
4. Do not break existing OAuth flow tests.